SEASONED EQUITY OFFERINGS FOR NEW INVESTMENT AND THE INFORMATION CONTENT OF INSIDER TRADES

Dana J. Johnson, Jan M. Serrano and G. Rodney Thompson

Journal of Financial Research, 1996, vol. 19, issue 1, 91-103

Abstract: Significant negative valuation effects are widely acknowledged for firms announcing seasoned equity offerings. This result is consistent with theoretical models linking new equity issues to increased adverse‐selection costs, lower management ownership in the firm, misuse of free cash flow, or expectations for earnings declines. Also increasingly evident, insiders trade around corporate announcements. We test the hypothesis that insider trading and announcements of new equity issues serve as joint signals in the market's evaluation of prospective capital investment projects. Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that insider trading is related to market reaction to announcements of new equity issues.

Date: 1996
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