Firm Transparency and the Costs of Going Public

James S. Ang and James C. Brau

Journal of Financial Research, 2002, vol. 25, issue 1, 1-17

Abstract: We demonstrate that firms that are more transparent pay less, in all components of issuance costs, to go public. We employ a sample of 334 previous leveraged buyouts and a characteristic‐matched control sample to test the hypothesis that greater firm transparency before the issue decreases the flotation costs of the initial public offering. These flotation costs are divided into initial underpricing, underwriter discount, administrative expenses, and the overallotment option required to take the firm public. Our results provide further evidence of the asymmetric information hypothesis as it applies to initial public offerings.

Date: 2002
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