An Analysis of Nonunderwritten Rights Offers: The Case of Closed‐END Funds

James A. Miles and Mark A. Peterson

Journal of Financial Research, 2002, vol. 25, issue 2, 187-202

Abstract: We study nonunderwritten rights offerings without subscription pre‐commitments from large shareholders. The results indicate firms incur substantial indirect costs in the form of price concessions for raising equity capital this way. The data therefore support the selling cost explanation of the rights‐offering paradox. Additionally, we describe how market participants collectively respond to intermediate such offerings.

Date: 2002
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6803.t01-1-00003

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jfnres:v:25:y:2002:i:2:p:187-202

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0270-2592

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Financial Research is currently edited by Jayant Kale and Gerald Gay

More articles in Journal of Financial Research from Southern Finance Association Contact information at EDIRC., Southwestern Finance Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().