Competition For Board Seats Following Stock‐For‐Stock Mergers

Wallace N. Davidson, Sameh Sakr and Yixi Ning

Journal of Financial Research, 2004, vol. 27, issue 1, 55-73

Abstract: We examine the board structure of firms following stock‐for‐stock mergers. We find that former target inside (outside) directors are more likely to join the combined firm board when target insiders (outsiders) have a relatively strong position on the pre‐merger target board. The relative size of the target firm, target firm profitability, and target blockholder ownership also influence whether target directors join the combined board. We conclude that competition for board seats on the combined board is won by target directors with greater bargaining positions.

Date: 2004
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