Institutional investors and mispricing of unionized firms

Viktoriya Lantushenko, Dalia Marciukaityte and Samuel H. Szewczyk

Journal of Financial Research, 2024, vol. 47, issue 2, 249-274

Abstract: We examine investment by different types of institutional investors in firms with strong labor unions. We find that hedge funds own a lower percentage of shares in these firms than in other firms. In contrast, passive institutional investors and institutional investors as a group own a higher percentage. Our tests suggest that the relation between unionization and hedge fund ownership is causal: When union power changes in a firm, hedge fund ownership changes in the opposite direction. Instead, passive investor holdings in unionized firms seem to be driven by other firm characteristics.

Date: 2024
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https://doi.org/10.1111/jfir.12367

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jfnres:v:47:y:2024:i:2:p:249-274

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