Brand Names and Price Discrimination

Asher Wolinsky

Journal of Industrial Economics, 1987, vol. 35, issue 3, 255-68

Abstract: This paper explains the fact that firms market both labeled and unlabeled products as a practice of price discrimination that emerges as a non-cooperative equilibrium outcome. The authors consider a market for a differentiated product where the possibility to price discriminate by the selective use of labels is due to the fact that buyers differ in the intensity of their preferences and that, before they buy, they are unable to distinguish among the different brands without the aid of identifying labels. Copyright 1987 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Date: 1987
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

Downloads: (external link)
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-1821%2819870 ... 0.CO%3B2-Y&origin=bc full text (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jindec:v:35:y:1987:i:3:p:255-68

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0022-1821

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Industrial Economics is currently edited by Pierre Regibeau, Yeon-Koo Che, Kenneth Corts, Thomas Hubbard, Patrick Legros and Frank Verboven

More articles in Journal of Industrial Economics from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().