Risk-Averse Duopolists and Voluntary Information Transmission

Morten Hviid

Journal of Industrial Economics, 1989, vol. 38, issue 1, 49-64

Abstract: This paper considers the incentives for risk-averse firms to share their private information. They show that the introduction of risk aversion in some cases reverses the result in the literature that no such incentives exist. Further, they show that the output level of risk-averse Cournot duopolists is increasing in the quality of their private information and decreasing in their perception of risk. Copyright 1989 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Date: 1989
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

Downloads: (external link)
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-1821%2819890 ... 0.CO%3B2-H&origin=bc full text (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jindec:v:38:y:1989:i:1:p:49-64

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0022-1821

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Industrial Economics is currently edited by Pierre Regibeau, Yeon-Koo Che, Kenneth Corts, Thomas Hubbard, Patrick Legros and Frank Verboven

More articles in Journal of Industrial Economics from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().