Market Leadership with a Sequence of History Dependent Patent Races

Flavio Delbono

Journal of Industrial Economics, 1989, vol. 38, issue 1, 95-101

Abstract: This note extends the results of J. Vickers (1986), examining the consequences on the evolution of market structure of having payoffs--and thus profits and incentives--which depend on the technological history of the firms. In a simple duopoly model, the author determines the conditions under which the technological leadership of a firm is strengthened over time (increasing dominance) or is progressively eroded by the rival (catching up). This reformulation of Vickers' model can also accommodate incremental innovations, i.e., technological changes that do not allow the innovator to overtake the rival. Copyright 1989 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Date: 1989
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