Horizontal Mergers and Antitrust Policy
Randolph McAfee and
Michael Williams ()
Journal of Industrial Economics, 1992, vol. 40, issue 2, 181-87
The welfare implications of horizontal mergers are examined in the context of the Cournot-Nash model of M. Perry and R. Porter (1985). Horizontal mergers are more likely to be welfare enhancing the more concentrated is the ownership of the nonmerging firms. Mergers that create a new largest firm, or increase the size of the largest firm, reduce welfare. Copyright 1992 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
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