Horizontal Mergers in Spatially Differentiated Noncooperative Markets

Randolph McAfee, Joseph J Simons and Michael Williams ()

Journal of Industrial Economics, 1992, vol. 40, issue 4, 349-58

Abstract: The authors present a Cournot-Nash model of horizontal mergers between firms that engage in spatial price discrimination. The model extends the analysis of such mergers as presented in the U.S. Department of Justice's Merger Guidelines. Rather than conclude the evaluation of such a merger with an estimate of the postmerger Hirschman-Herfindahl Index, as is done in the Merger Guidelines, the authors' model yields an estimate of the increases in the equilibrium, postmerger delivered.prices caused by the merger. Copyright 1992 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Date: 1992
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