Reservation Price Announcements in Sealed Bid Auctions

Kathleen Carey

Journal of Industrial Economics, 1993, vol. 41, issue 4, 421-29

Abstract: This article compares the strategic announcement of a reservation price by a bid-taking buyer in a first-price sealed bid auction with the strategy of no announcement. Simulation results indicate that an operative ceiling price that is unknown to bidders will yield lower supply costs to the buyer than when the latter announces the reservation price truthfully. However, given enough bidders, the buyer can achieve an even lower expected cost of supply by announcing a falsely low reservation price. Copyright 1993 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Date: 1993
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-1821%2819931 ... 0.CO%3B2-S&origin=bc full text (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jindec:v:41:y:1993:i:4:p:421-29

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0022-1821

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Industrial Economics is currently edited by Pierre Regibeau, Yeon-Koo Che, Kenneth Corts, Thomas Hubbard, Patrick Legros and Frank Verboven

More articles in Journal of Industrial Economics from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().