Trade Unions and Firms' Product Market Power
Journal of Industrial Economics, 1996, vol. 44, issue 3, 289-307
A production function model with efficient bargaining between oligopolistic firms and unions is developed to distinguish between product market power and union power in capturing economic rents. The model is formalized using the generalized Nash bargaining solution and is empirically tested on four Belgian manufacturing sectors. The conclusions are that product market power is significantly eroded by wage rents but firms retain most of their power during negotiations. Also, the restrictions imposed on the data do not reject the hypothesis that wage erosion arises from efficient bargaining in accordance with other empirical findings for Belgian manufacturing. Copyright 1996 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (25) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-1821%2819960 ... 0.CO%3B2-9&origin=bc full text (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.
Working Paper: Trade unions and firms' product market power (1996)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jindec:v:44:y:1996:i:3:p:289-307
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0022-1821
Access Statistics for this article
Journal of Industrial Economics is currently edited by Pierre Regibeau, Yeon-Koo Che, Kenneth Corts, Thomas Hubbard, Patrick Legros and Frank Verboven
More articles in Journal of Industrial Economics from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().