Search Intensity in Oligopoly

Paulo Guimaraes

Journal of Industrial Economics, 1996, vol. 44, issue 4, 415-26

Abstract: A simultaneous price-setting oligopoly game characterized by the existence of buyers with differing price information is presented. The information structure of the game is more general than previously considered, thereby permitting a richer analysis. In addition to identifying the general conditions that lead to equilibrium with price dispersion, the author provides a revealing reinterpretation of models characterized by simpler information structures. An important finding of the paper is that additional price information in the market impacts prices differently. Only if the poorly informed buyers are reached can we expect average prices to decrease. Copyright 1996 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Date: 1996
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