Bundling and Menus of Two‐Part Tariffs

Sreya Kolay and Greg Shaffer

Journal of Industrial Economics, 2003, vol. 51, issue 3, 383-403

Abstract: Inducing self‐selection among different segments of consumers is an important issue in pricing. Some firms induce self‐selection by offering a menu of two‐part tariffs (e.g., different rate plans) and letting consumers select the tariff and quantity they prefer. Other firms induce self‐selection by offering a menu of price‐quantity bundles (e.g., different package sizes) and letting consumers select only from among these bundles. We show that bundling is more profitable absent cost considerations. Social welfare may be higher or lower with bundling.

Date: 2003
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