Insurer‐hospital bargaining: negotiated discounts in post‐deregulation connecticut

Alan T. Sorensen

Journal of Industrial Economics, 2003, vol. 51, issue 4, 469-490

Abstract: This paper uses unique data from the state of Connecticut to examine discounting patterns in the state's hospital industry for the years following deregulation (1995‐1998). The data provide a rare opportunity to study payer‐level differences in negotiated discounts for hospital services. In addition to presenting descriptive evidence on how discounts vary across payers, payer types and hospital types, this study uses matched revenue data to analyze and empirically estimate the economic determinants of discount magnitudes. Payer size appears to affect bargaining power, but the economic significance of the effect is small. Much larger than the effect of payer size is the influence of payers' abilities to ‘move market share’ by channeling patients to hospitals with which favorable discounts have been negotiated.

Date: 2003
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (53)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0022-1821.2003.00211.x

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jindec:v:51:y:2003:i:4:p:469-490

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0022-1821

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Industrial Economics is currently edited by Pierre Regibeau, Yeon-Koo Che, Kenneth Corts, Thomas Hubbard, Patrick Legros and Frank Verboven

More articles in Journal of Industrial Economics from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().