Optimal Regulation of Cooperative R&D Under Incomplete Information

Isabelle Brocas

Journal of Industrial Economics, 2004, vol. 52, issue 1, 81-120

Abstract: A regulator offers a cooperation contract to two firms to develop a research project. The contract provides incentives to encourage skill‐sharing and coordinate subsequent efforts. Innovators must get informational rents to disclose their privately known skills, which results in distorting R&D efforts with respect to the first‐best level. When efforts are strategic complements, both efforts are distorted downwards. By contrast, when efforts are strategic substitutes, the effort of the firm with most valuable skills is distorted downwards (to decrease rents) and the effort of the other firm is distorted upwards (to compensate the previous efficiency loss).

Date: 2004
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