Spillovers, Investment Incentives and the Property Rights Theory of the Firm

David de Meza and Ben Lockwood

Journal of Industrial Economics, 2004, vol. 52, issue 2, 229-253

Abstract: This paper examines the property rights theory of the firm when a manager's relationship‐specific investment can be partially appropriated by the owner of an asset even if cooperation breaks down. The investments of non owners may then be devalued, but are seldom wholly lost to the owner. With such spillovers, the outside‐option principle can be incorporated into the Grossman‐Hart‐Moore framework without implying that ownership demotivates. Enriched predictions on the determinants of integration emerge.

Date: 2004
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0022-1821.2004.00224.x

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jindec:v:52:y:2004:i:2:p:229-253

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0022-1821

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Industrial Economics is currently edited by Pierre Regibeau, Yeon-Koo Che, Kenneth Corts, Thomas Hubbard, Patrick Legros and Frank Verboven

More articles in Journal of Industrial Economics from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().