POST‐CARTEL PRICING DURING LITIGATION

Joseph Harrington ()

Journal of Industrial Economics, 2004, vol. 52, issue 4, 517-533

Abstract: Standard methods in the U.S. for calculating antitrust damages in price‐fixing cases are shown to create a strategic incentive for firms to price above the non‐collusive price after the cartel has been dissolved. This results in an overestimate of the but for price and an underestimate of the level of damages. The extent of this upward bias in the but for price is greater, the longer the cartel was in place and the more concentrated the industry.

Date: 2004
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0022-1821.2004.00238.x

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Working Paper: Post-Cartel Pricing during Litigation (2003)
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