OPTIMAL PRICING AND QUALITY CHOICE WHEN INVESTMENT IN QUALITY IS IRREVERSIBLE

Enrico Pennings

Journal of Industrial Economics, 2004, vol. 52, issue 4, 569-589

Abstract: This paper examines the price and quality choice of a single product, risk‐neutral monopolist who can delay irreversible investments required for market entry. It is shown that the price and quality she chooses at entry increase with uncertainty about the size of future demand. In a Stackelberg leader‐follower game, the leader and follower pre‐commit immediately up to a certain level of uncertainty. In this case the leader produces the higher quality good. When uncertainty is higher than this threshold, the follower will wait and enter the market later with a higher quality good.

Date: 2004
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0022-1821.2004.00241.x

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