PRODUCT MARKET COMPETITION AND AGENCY COSTS*
Jen Baggs and
Jean-Etienne de Bettignies
Journal of Industrial Economics, 2007, vol. 55, issue 2, 289-323
Abstract:
We model the effects of competition on managerial efficiency and isolate the agency effect of competition, present only in firms subject to agency costs, from the direct pressure effect of competition, which is present in all firms. Using a unique set of Canadian data that surveys both firms and their employees, we then evaluate the empirical significance of these two effects. We find that competition has a significant direct pressure effect as well as a significant agency effect. Both effects increase the importance firms place on quality improvements and cost reductions as well as on contractual incentives and employee effort.
Date: 2007
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6451.2007.00312.x
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jindec:v:55:y:2007:i:2:p:289-323
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