PRICE COMPETITION IN U.S. BREWING -super-*
Journal of Industrial Economics, 2008, vol. 56, issue 1, 1-31
This study utilizes a brand-level dataset that captures a unique natural experiment, a 100% increase in the excise tax, to evaluate different pricing models in the U.S. beer industry. To assess the plausibility of different models, the increase in marginal cost resulting from the tax increase is exploited: observed prices in the post-increase period are compared to the prices that should be observed under various pricing models. Three types of models are analyzed: Bertrand-Nash, leadership, and collusion. Results indicate that extreme cases of collusion can be confidently ruled out while several models may explain the observed prices equally well. Copyright 2008 The Author.
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-6451.2008.00330.x link to full text (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jindec:v:56:y:2008:i:1:p:1-31
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0022-1821
Access Statistics for this article
Journal of Industrial Economics is currently edited by Pierre Regibeau, Yeon-Koo Che, Kenneth Corts, Thomas Hubbard, Patrick Legros and Frank Verboven
More articles in Journal of Industrial Economics from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().