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Sandro Brusco and Giuseppe (Pino) Lopomo ()

Journal of Industrial Economics, 2008, vol. 56, issue 1, 113-142

Abstract: The possibility, even if arbitrarily small, of binding budget constraints in simultaneous ascending bid auctions induces strategic demand reduction and generates significant inefficiencies. Under mild conditions on the distributions of the bidders' values, unconstrained bidders behave as if they were liquidity constrained, even as the probability that bidders are budget constrained goes to zero. Copyright 2008 The Authors.

Date: 2008
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Journal of Industrial Economics is currently edited by Pierre Regibeau, Yeon-Koo Che, Kenneth Corts, Thomas Hubbard, Patrick Legros and Frank Verboven

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