VERTICAL RESTRAINTS UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION: ON THE ROLE OF PARTICIPATION CONSTRAINTS -super-*
Antonio Acconcia (),
Riccardo Martina and
Salvatore Piccolo ()
Journal of Industrial Economics, 2008, vol. 56, issue 2, 379-401
The impact on vertical contracting of a type-dependent reservation utility is investigated within a sequential monopolies environment with asymmetric information. The welfare and private properties of contracts controlling both the retail price and the sales level are compared with those restricting only sales. When firms choose contracts non-cooperatively, retail price restrictions are desirable for the upstream supplier although detrimental to consumers, whenever the retailer reservation utility has a relevant impact on optimal contracts. If this impact is relatively weak and contracts are chosen cooperatively, vertical price control fails to maximize firms' joint-profit although it would be beneficial to consumers. Copyright 2008 The Authors. Journal compilation 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. and the Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial Economics.
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-6451.2008.00345.x link to full text (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jindec:v:56:y:2008:i:2:p:379-401
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0022-1821
Access Statistics for this article
Journal of Industrial Economics is currently edited by Pierre Regibeau, Yeon-Koo Che, Kenneth Corts, Thomas Hubbard, Patrick Legros and Frank Verboven
More articles in Journal of Industrial Economics from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().