PRIVATE ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT IN THE PRESENCE OF PRE‐TRIAL BARGAINING*

Sylvain Bourjade, Patrick Rey and Paul Seabright

Journal of Industrial Economics, 2009, vol. 57, issue 3, 372-409

Abstract: We study the effect of encouraging private actions for breaches of competition law. We develop a model of litigation and settlement with asymmetric information. We show that screening liable from non‐liable defendants requires the Court to restrict the rules governing admissible evidence. We study how to design the rules so as to enhance the role of private litigation in antitrust enforcement and prove that increasing damages is better than reducing costs of initiating suits. We also find large benefits from introducing a system of compensation for defendants found non‐liable, paid by unsuccessful plaintiffs.

Date: 2009
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6451.2009.00383.x

Related works:
Working Paper: Private Antitrust Enforcement in the Presence of Pre-Trial Bargaining (2009)
Working Paper: Private antitrust enforcement in the presence of pre-trial bargaining (2009)
Working Paper: Private Antitrust Enforcement in the Presence of Pre-Trial Bargaining (2009)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jindec:v:57:y:2009:i:3:p:372-409

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0022-1821

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Industrial Economics is currently edited by Pierre Regibeau, Yeon-Koo Che, Kenneth Corts, Thomas Hubbard, Patrick Legros and Frank Verboven

More articles in Journal of Industrial Economics from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().