Economic Efficiency and Political Capture in Public Service Contracts

Philippe Gagnepain and Marc Ivaldi

Journal of Industrial Economics, 2017, vol. 65, issue 1, 1-38

Date: 2017
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Working Paper: Economic Efficiency and Political Capture in Public Service Contracts (2017)
Working Paper: Economic Efficiency and Political Capture in Public Service Contracts (2017)
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