Collusion Under Imperfect Monitoring with Asymmetric Firms

Luke Garrod and Matthew Olczak

Journal of Industrial Economics, 2017, vol. 65, issue 3, 654-682

Date: 2017
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Working Paper: Collusion under Imperfect Monitoring with Asymmetric Firms (2016)
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