The Geography of Lender Behavior in Peer‐to‐Peer Loan Markets

Garrett T. Senney

Journal of Industrial Economics, 2019, vol. 67, issue 1, 1-36

Abstract: This paper empirically investigates the role of geography in online peer‐to‐peer loan markets. Using transaction level data, I find strong evidence that lenders are more informed about local projects and have higher demand for better performing local projects. This effect is shown to be driven by informational frictions. Additionally, listings with more early local bidding attract more lenders, leading to a higher probability of funding and a lower final interest rate, if funded. My results are consistent with localness embodying some incidentally obtained initial informational advantage which rationally causes persistent information asymmetries.

Date: 2019
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12195

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jindec:v:67:y:2019:i:1:p:1-36

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0022-1821

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Industrial Economics is currently edited by Pierre Regibeau, Yeon-Koo Che, Kenneth Corts, Thomas Hubbard, Patrick Legros and Frank Verboven

More articles in Journal of Industrial Economics from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().