Pricing Schemes and Seller Fraud: Evidence from New York City Taxi Rides

Ting Liu, Estefania Vergara‐Cobos and Yiyi Zhou ()
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Estefania Vergara-Cobos ()

Journal of Industrial Economics, 2019, vol. 67, issue 1, 56-90

Abstract: Different pricing schemes gives sellers different financial incentives to defraud consumers. Using rich microdata on New York City taxi rides, we examine the differences in traveled distance, duration and fare between trips taken by non‐local passengers and those by comparable local passengers. We find that, for trips subject to a two‐part tariff, the discrepancies are larger when the variable rate is higher, or when the expected post‐dropoff occupancy is lower; furthermore, the impact of the post‐dropoff occupancy is more pronounced when the variable rate is higher. In contrast, trips subject to a flat fare scheme do not exhibit these patterns.

Date: 2019
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12196

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jindec:v:67:y:2019:i:1:p:56-90

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0022-1821

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Industrial Economics is currently edited by Pierre Regibeau, Yeon-Koo Che, Kenneth Corts, Thomas Hubbard, Patrick Legros and Frank Verboven

More articles in Journal of Industrial Economics from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().