Market Power and Joint Ownership: Evidence from Nuclear Plants in Sweden
Erik Lundin ()
Journal of Industrial Economics, 2021, vol. 69, issue 3, 485-536
I examine the anticompetitive effects of joint ownership by analyzing the operation of three Swedish nuclear plants. I formulate a model of optimal maintenance allocation given three behavioral assumptions: i) maximal collusion, where all owners’ profits on both nuclear and other output are jointly maximized; ii) Cournot competition, where the majority owners’ profits on both nuclear and other output are maximized; and iii) a divested solution, where all owners’ profits on nuclear output are maximized. Maximal collusion is only achieved during the summer, when regulatory oversight is less strict. During the winter, data is instead consistent with the divested solution.
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Working Paper: Market Power and Joint Ownership: Evidence from Nuclear Plants in Sweden (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jindec:v:69:y:2021:i:3:p:485-536
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