Corporate Leniency in a Dynamic World: The Preemptive Push of an Uncertain Future

Dennis L. Gärtner

Journal of Industrial Economics, 2022, vol. 70, issue 1, 119-146

Abstract: This paper investigates how leniency programs induce collusive offenders to self report in a dynamic setting, where the risk of independent detection evolves stochastically over time. We show how uncertainty about the future can push firms into preemptive application, and how these preemptive incentives can unravel to the point where firms apply long before the risk of detection is in any way imminent. For policy, the analysis suggests that a relatively harsh treatment of latecomers may be more important than offering high absolute reductions or even rewards, and that leniency should be available to firms who are already under investigation.

Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12265

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jindec:v:70:y:2022:i:1:p:119-146

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0022-1821

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Industrial Economics is currently edited by Pierre Regibeau, Yeon-Koo Che, Kenneth Corts, Thomas Hubbard, Patrick Legros and Frank Verboven

More articles in Journal of Industrial Economics from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().