Quality Disclosure and Product Selection

Tianle Song

Journal of Industrial Economics, 2022, vol. 70, issue 2, 323-346

Abstract: If entry requires accommodation by retailers, an incumbent manufacturer may transfer profits to retailers to maintain his dominant position. We show that such an incentive to transfer will induce a high‐quality entrant to disclose quality information prior to entry. Interestingly, retailers will accommodate not only a high‐quality entrant but also an intermediate‐quality entrant who chooses not to disclose. If disclosure is mandatory, however, only a high‐quality entrant can enter the market. Therefore, mandatory disclosure may be excessive in terms of consumer welfare.

Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12286

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jindec:v:70:y:2022:i:2:p:323-346

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0022-1821

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Industrial Economics is currently edited by Pierre Regibeau, Yeon-Koo Che, Kenneth Corts, Thomas Hubbard, Patrick Legros and Frank Verboven

More articles in Journal of Industrial Economics from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().