Platform Encroachment and Own‐Content Bias

Yusuke Zennyo

Journal of Industrial Economics, 2022, vol. 70, issue 3, 684-710

Abstract: This paper presents a model of platform encroachment, in which a platform not only acts as an intermediary between consumers and third‐party sellers, but also sells its first‐party products. When encroaching, the platform chooses between fair and biased search engines. Under the fair search, all products are equally likely to appear in search results, whereas the first‐party product is more likely to appear under biased search. Biased encroachment makes the platform impose a lower commission on sellers, which leads to a lower equilibrium price which consequently attracts more consumers. Increased consumer participation can raise seller participation through indirect network externalities.

Date: 2022
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12301

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jindec:v:70:y:2022:i:3:p:684-710

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0022-1821

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Industrial Economics is currently edited by Pierre Regibeau, Yeon-Koo Che, Kenneth Corts, Thomas Hubbard, Patrick Legros and Frank Verboven

More articles in Journal of Industrial Economics from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().