Price Commitments in Standard Setting under Asymmetric Information

Jan Boone, Florian Schuett and Emanuele Tarantino

Journal of Industrial Economics, 2024, vol. 72, issue 1, 3-19

Abstract: Standards may create market power for the holders of standard essential patents (SEPs). To address these concerns, the literature advocates price commitments, whereby SEP holders commit to the maximum royalty they would charge were their technology included in the standard. We consider a setting in which a technology implementer holds private information about profitability. In this setting, price commitments increase efficiency not only by curbing SEP holders' market power, but also by alleviating distortions in the design of the royalty scheme. We derive conditions under which price commitments can be implemented using a simple royalty cap as used in practice.

Date: 2024
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12351

Related works:
Working Paper: Price Commitments in Standard Setting under Asymmetric Information (2019)
Working Paper: Price Commitments in Standard Setting under Asymmetric Information (2019)
Working Paper: Price Commitments in Standard Setting under Asymmetric Information (2019)
Working Paper: Price Commitments in Standard Setting under Asymmetric Information (2019)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jindec:v:72:y:2024:i:1:p:3-19

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0022-1821

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Industrial Economics is currently edited by Pierre Regibeau, Yeon-Koo Che, Kenneth Corts, Thomas Hubbard, Patrick Legros and Frank Verboven

More articles in Journal of Industrial Economics from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().