Positive and Negative Sorting in Team Contests

Qiang Fu, Zenan Wu, Hanyao Zhang and Yangfan Zhou

Journal of Industrial Economics, 2024, vol. 72, issue 3, 1021-1051

Abstract: This paper investigates the formation of teams in a contest. A manager sorts four workers—who differ in their productivity—into two teams. Workers on each team join forces to produce team output, and one team wins a prize; for example, a bonus package. Two sorting patterns are possible: Positive sorting requires that each team consist of players of same caliber and negative sorting the opposite. We characterize the optimum. We further extend the model to allow the manager to set a prize schedule for the workers on each team upon a win, allocate productive resources between teams, and pick the level of competition of the contest.

Date: 2024
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12381

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jindec:v:72:y:2024:i:3:p:1021-1051

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0022-1821

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Industrial Economics is currently edited by Pierre Regibeau, Yeon-Koo Che, Kenneth Corts, Thomas Hubbard, Patrick Legros and Frank Verboven

More articles in Journal of Industrial Economics from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().