Heterogeneous Price Technologies

Saara Hämäläinen

Journal of Industrial Economics, 2025, vol. 73, issue 2, 316-332

Abstract: We present a unified theory of dynamic oligopoly pricing with heterogeneous information technologies on each side of the market. Trackers (on the firm‐side) and shoppers (on the consumer‐side) can follow market prices costlessly, whereas non‐trackers and non‐shoppers cannot. We describe both non‐collusive and collusive equilibria. While the effects of tracking may be non‐monotone, the presence of trackers generally harms consumers. The price pattern that arises with trackers and non‐trackers reconciles a multitude of cross‐sectional price patterns, such as persistent price differences and adherence to or avoidance of certain prices. We find that non‐trackers can counter tracker collusion by applying a limit‐price strategy.

Date: 2025
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12411

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jindec:v:73:y:2025:i:2:p:316-332

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0022-1821

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Industrial Economics is currently edited by Pierre Regibeau, Yeon-Koo Che, Kenneth Corts, Thomas Hubbard, Patrick Legros and Frank Verboven

More articles in Journal of Industrial Economics from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().