DISCUSSION OF OPTIMAL-CONTRACTS WITH COSTLY CONDITIONAL AUDITING

Jc Fellingham

Journal of Accounting Research, 1980, vol. 18, 129-133

Keywords: Contracting; Conditional auditing; Information asymmetry; Productive input (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D81 D86 M41 M42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1980
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2490332.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:joares:v:18:y:1980:i::p:129-133

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/1475679x

DOI: 10.2307/2490332

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Accounting Research is currently edited by Philip G. Berger, Anna Costello, Luzi Hail, Valeri Nikolaev, Haresh Sapra, Laurence van Lent and Regina Wittenberg Moerman

More articles in Journal of Accounting Research from John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().