ON AUDITORS AND THE COURTS IN AN ADVERSE SELECTION SETTING

Nd Melumad and L Thoman

Journal of Accounting Research, 1990, vol. 28, issue 1, 77-120

Keywords: Agency model; Signaling; Auditing; Audit fee (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D81 M40 M42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1990
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (29)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:joares:v:28:y:1990:i:1:p:77-120

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DOI: 10.2307/2491218

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