Is There a Link between Executive Equity Incentives and Accounting Fraud?

Merle Erickson, Michelle Hanlon and Edward L. Maydew

Journal of Accounting Research, 2006, vol. 44, issue 1, 113-143

Abstract: We compare executive equity incentives of firms accused of accounting fraud by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) during the period 1996–2003 with two samples of firms not accused of fraud. We measure equity incentives in a variety of ways and employ a battery of empirical tests. We find no consistent evidence that executive equity incentives are associated with fraud. These results stand in contrast to assertions by policy makers that incentives from stock‐based compensation and the resulting equity holdings increase the likelihood of accounting fraud.

Date: 2006
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (153)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-679X.2006.00194.x

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:joares:v:44:y:2006:i:1:p:113-143

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0021-8456

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Accounting Research is currently edited by Philip G. Berger, Luzi Hail, Christian Leuz, Haresh Sapra, Douglas J. Skinner, Rodrigo Verdi and Regina Wittenberg Moerman

More articles in Journal of Accounting Research from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().