 Did the Dodd–Frank Whistleblower Provision Deter Accounting Fraud?Philip G. Berger and Heemin Lee Journal of Accounting Research, 2022, vol. 60, issue 4, 1337-1378 Abstract: We examine the deterrence effect of the Dodd–Frank whistleblower provision on accounting fraud. To facilitate causal inference, we use state False Claims Acts (FCAs), under which whistleblowing about accounting fraud at a firm invested in by a state's pension fund can result in monetary rewards from that state's government. We divide our sample into firms exposed and not exposed to whistleblowing risk from a state FCA during the 2008–2010 period that preceded the 2011 SEC implementation of the Dodd–Frank whistleblowing provision. We hypothesize that firms already exposed to a state FCA whistleblower law are less affected by the Dodd–Frank whistleblower provision. Using the companies exposed to a state FCA as control firms in our Dodd–Frank tests, the remaining firms constitute the treatment sample. We find that exposure to Dodd–Frank reduces the likelihood of accounting fraud of treatment firms by 12%–22% relative to control firms, but do not find that it affects audit fees. Date: 2022 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:joares:v:60:y:2022:i:4:p:1337-1378 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article Journal of Accounting Research is currently edited by Philip G. Berger, Luzi Hail, Christian Leuz, Haresh Sapra, Douglas J. Skinner, Rodrigo Verdi and Regina Wittenberg Moerman More articles in Journal of Accounting Research from Wiley Blackwell |
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