Dynamic Information Acquisition, Investment, and Disclosure

Seung Y. Lee and Iván Marinovic

Journal of Accounting Research, 2025, vol. 63, issue 4, 1547-1581

Abstract: We present a dynamic model of information acquisition and disclosure. The manager seeks to maximize future stock prices and collects information privately about the firm's fundamentals. Information acquisition increases the arrival rate of private information. The manager can choose to disclose his private information or withhold it in perpetuity. We study the impact of information acquisition on the accumulation of private information, disclosure, and the firm's initial investment.

Date: 2025
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https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679X.12610

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:joares:v:63:y:2025:i:4:p:1547-1581

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Journal of Accounting Research is currently edited by Philip G. Berger, Anna Costello, Luzi Hail, Valeri Nikolaev, Haresh Sapra, Laurence van Lent and Regina Wittenberg Moerman

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