Cognitive Science, Bayesian Norms and Rules of Evidence

Craig R. Callen

Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series A, 1991, vol. 154, issue 1, 129-130

Abstract: This paper analyses arguments that Bayesian personalist models should be normative in the formulation of evidence rules for litigation (Fienberg and Schervish, 1986; Lempert, 1986). Relying on research from cognitive science, it concludes that the models are poor sources for such norms because their empirical assumptions about human cognition are inaccurate.

Date: 1991
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jorssa:v:154:y:1991:i:1:p:129-130

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