Subjective Probability, Decision Analysis and Their Legal Consequences

Dennis V. Lindley

Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series A, 1991, vol. 154, issue 1, 83-92

Abstract: The paper explores the consequences in a court of law of using probability as the measure of uncertainty and reaching decisions by maximizing expected utility. The nature of probability as a belief measure is discussed and its dependence on one's state of knowledge at the time that the belief is expressed is emphasized. The probabilities at the beginning and the end of the trial are considered and the combination of the probability at the end of the trial with utility is explained. The method of sentencing based on maximizing expected utility is shown to lead to action in cases where the probability of guilt is lower than would ordinarily be required. Admissibility of evidence and the adversarial approach are discussed in the light of the probability argument. The problem of the gatecrasher is used to illustrate points and a new solution is offered.

Date: 1991
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