 CRIME IN A MULTI‐JURISDICTIONAL MODEL WITH PRIVATE AND PUBLIC PREVENTION*Kangoh Lee and Santiago Pinto () Journal of Regional Science, 2009, vol. 49, issue 5, 977-996 Abstract: ABSTRACT Criminals move between jurisdictions in response to differences in the net returns to crime that depend on the opportunity for crime and the effort to prevent crime. An increase in police protection of a jurisdiction diverts crime to other jurisdictions when only public crime prevention such as police protection is available. However, residents also invest in private prevention (private security, burglar alarms, etc.), and the value of these measures depends on the level of local public protection. In a spatial context, an increase in public prevention of a jurisdiction not only alters the incentives of individuals of the jurisdiction, but also of other jurisdictions as well, and such a change in private crime prevention may end up attracting crime to the jurisdiction. An increase in public prevention of a jurisdiction thus may divert or attract crime. This ambiguous effect stands in contrast with the literature and may appear counterintuitive, but is logical under plausible conditions. Date: 2009 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jregsc:v:49:y:2009:i:5:p:977-996 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article Journal of Regional Science is currently edited by Marlon G. Boarnet, Matthew Kahn and Mark D. Partridge More articles in Journal of Regional Science from Wiley Blackwell |
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