LOCAL POLITICS AND ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY: INFORMATION AGGREGATION AND POLARIZATION
Marcus Berliant () and
Takatoshi Tabuchi ()
Journal of Regional Science, 2014, vol. 54, issue 5, 806-827
type="main"> We consider information aggregation in national and local elections when voters are mobile and might sort themselves into local districts. Using a standard model of private information for voters in elections in combination with a new economic geography model, agglomeration occurs for economic reasons, whereas voter stratification occurs due to political preferences. When trade is more costly, people tend to agglomerate for economic reasons, resulting in full information equivalence in the political sector. Under free trade, people sort themselves into districts, most of which are polarized, resulting in no full information equivalence in these districts.
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