The impact of bargaining delays under the threat of eminent domain

Javier E. Portillo

Journal of Regional Science, 2018, vol. 58, issue 2, 451-482

Abstract: Developers seeking to assemble complementary parcels of land will likely encounter strategic behavior by landowners. Using a property†level data set from Florida's Department of Transportation covering the period January 2000 to July 2014, I test whether bargaining delays lead to higher final transaction prices. Given the nature of the data, I can compare properties within the same roadway project to estimate the effect of delayed negotiations. My empirical estimates indicate that bargaining delays lead to increased final transaction prices. The magnitude of this effect is approximately 7 percent for the average holdout, however, the effect is nonlinear and diminishes over time.

Date: 2018
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