Political tournaments and regional growth‐enhancing policies: Evidence from Chinese prefectures

Yu Bai and Yanjun Li

Journal of Regional Science, 2022, vol. 62, issue 5, 1358-1385

Abstract: In a performance‐based promotion mechanism that rewards economic growth, we demonstrate how local governments' chiefs are incentivized to make policy decisions favored by upper‐level offices. Using annual data from prefectures in China, we find evidence that in response to a higher level of competition in the geographic cluster, local chiefs implement several growth‐enhancing policies. These include prioritizing investment in public infrastructure over redistributive spending and allocating additional resources in the core regions, relative to the cross‐jurisdictional borders. We also find that these policies lead to further regional growth. The results remain consistent even when we instrument the endogenous political replacements with the sudden death of chiefs, and when we use various measures for the effectiveness of chiefs. This evidence suggests that relative performance evaluation plays an essential role in the political system of China.

Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/jors.12607

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jregsc:v:62:y:2022:i:5:p:1358-1385

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0022-4146

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Regional Science is currently edited by Marlon G. Boarnet, Matthew Kahn and Mark D. Partridge

More articles in Journal of Regional Science from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().