Mandatory Pensions and the Intensity of Adverse Selection in Life Insurance Markets

Bertrand Villeneuve

Journal of Risk & Insurance, 2003, vol. 70, issue 3, 527-548

Abstract: This article examines the impact of varying mandatory pensions on saving, life insurance, and annuity markets in an adverse selection economy. Under reasonable restrictions, we find unambiguous effects on market size, participation rates, and equilibrium prices. The degree of adverse selection, whether a market is active or inactive, and social welfare are analyzed.

Date: 2003
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jrinsu:v:70:y:2003:i:3:p:527-548

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