Incentives for Voluntary Disclosure of Quality Information in HMO Markets

Kyoungrae Jung

Journal of Risk & Insurance, 2010, vol. 77, issue 1, 183-210

Abstract: This study examines incentives for voluntary disclosure of quality information by health maintenance organizations (HMOs). Economic theory predicts complete voluntary disclosure without mandatory rules. This article introduces plans’ selection motives to avoid high‐risk consumers as a deterrent of full unraveling; if disclosure is expected to attract high‐risk members, plans have incentives to withhold information. The empirical analysis shows that while market unraveling was an important mechanism to bring disclosure, it was not complete, and plans in markets with high‐risk consumers were less likely to disclose. This study suggests that market unraveling may not arise if risk selection incentives are prevalent.

Date: 2010
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1539-6975.2009.01339.x

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jrinsu:v:77:y:2010:i:1:p:183-210

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.wiley.com/bw/subs.asp?ref=0022-4367

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Risk & Insurance is currently edited by Joan T. Schmit

More articles in Journal of Risk & Insurance from The American Risk and Insurance Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().