The Effects of Regulated Premium Subsidies on Insurance Costs: An Empirical Analysis of Automobile Insurance

Mary Weiss, Sharon Tennyson and Laureen Regan

Journal of Risk & Insurance, 2010, vol. 77, issue 3, 597-624

Abstract: State regulation of rates is sometimes used as a means to make automobile insurance more affordable to consumers by restricting insurer profits and pricing practices. Incentive distortions arising from this type of rate regulation might lead to higher accident rates and higher insurance loss costs. Annual state‐level panel data for the time period 1980–1998 are used to investigate these effects, using empirical methods that recognize the endogenous determination of states’ regulatory choices. Results suggest that rate regulation that systematically suppresses (some or all) drivers’ insurance premiums is associated with significantly higher average loss costs and higher insurance claim frequency.

Date: 2010
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1539-6975.2010.01360.x

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jrinsu:v:77:y:2010:i:3:p:597-624

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