The Quality of Insurance Intermediary Services—Empirical Evidence for Germany
Martina Eckardt and
Solvig Räthke‐Döppner
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Solvig Raethke-Doeppner
Journal of Risk & Insurance, 2010, vol. 77, issue 3, 667-701
Abstract:
Competing insurance intermediaries provide heterogeneous services that are difficult for incompletely informed consumers to assess. Transaction cost economics, search theory, and principal‐agent theory provide arguments on product quality differences between exclusive agents and independent intermediaries. This article uses a sample of 927 insurance intermediaries in Germany. By performing OLS estimations, we test the impact of the different distribution channels and other factors on intermediaries’ service quality. Depending on the proxies used for service quality, we find mixed evidence for the product quality hypothesis. Service quality depends to a large extent on the information‐gathering and processing activities of the individual intermediaries, independent of the respective distribution channel.
Date: 2010
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)
Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1539-6975.2010.01361.x
Related works:
Working Paper: The Quality of Insurance Intermediary Services – Empirical Evidence for Germany (2008) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jrinsu:v:77:y:2010:i:3:p:667-701
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.wiley.com/bw/subs.asp?ref=0022-4367
Access Statistics for this article
Journal of Risk & Insurance is currently edited by Joan T. Schmit
More articles in Journal of Risk & Insurance from The American Risk and Insurance Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().